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Abstract
In recent work by Bramoullé and Kranton [2], a model for the provision of public
goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game
and properties of the network were established. This model was further extended
to include games with imperfect substitutability in Bramoullé et al. [3]. The vast
multiplicity of equilibria in such games along with the drastic changes in equilibria
with small changes in network structure, makes it challenging for a system planner
to estimate the maximum social welfare of such a game or to devise interventions
that enhance this welfare. Our main results address this challenge by providing
close approximations to the maximum social welfare and the maximum aggregate
play in terms of only network characteristics such as the maximum degree and
independence number. For the special case when the underlying network is a tree,
we derive formulae which use only the number of nodes and their degrees. These
results allow a system planner to assess aggregate outcomes and design interventions
for the game, directly from the underlying graph structure, without enumerating all
equilibria of the game, thereby significantly simplifying the planner’s problem. A
part of our results can be viewed as a logical extension of [7] where the maximum
weighted aggregate effort of the model in [2] was characterized as the weighted
independence number of the graph.
1 Introduction
In many settings of competition, the actions of only a subset of all agents directly affect
the utility of an agent. The underlying structure of these interactions can be captured
using a network or graph. The study of the resulting strategic interaction on a network
provides insights into how interconnections, such as physical connections or economic
and social interdependencies, affect the outcomes of interactions. These models have
been applied for understanding diverse contexts such as crime, segregation, investment,
research cooperation and so on.
In this paper, we consider noncooperative games of positive externalities where players
are situated on nodes of a network whose edges represent preexisting interconnections
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through which the actions of the neighbors of an agent influence the latter’s utility.
Beginning with the work of Bramoullé and Kranton [2] on the provision of local public
goods in the presence of networks, and extending further to Bramoullé et al. [3], many
beautiful results have been found relating the nature of equilibria in such games to network
structure. For instance, in the particular case of a public goods game on a network,
assuming perfect substitutability, Bramoullé and Kranton showed that certain classes of
Nash equilibria [6], called specialized equilibria, are in one-to-one correspondence with
maximal independent sets in the network. These were also shown to be the only ‘stable’
equilibria [2]. Recently, Pandit and Kulkarni [7] showed an even stronger result – that the
maximum total effort over all equilibria of such a game was exactly the size of the largest
independent set in the network, and they identified independent sets corresponding to
‘influential’ and ‘frugal’ equilibria that well approximated the maximum welfare in such
games.
A common occurrence in such games, noticed by Bramoullé and Kranton [2], is the
vast multiplicity of equilibria. The number of specialized equilibria is itself exponential
in the number of agents or nodes in the network. In addition to specialized equilibria,
Bramoullé and Kranton [2] identify distributed and hybrid equilibria that are also preva-
lent in such games, further increasing the number of equilibria. Yet another recurring
phenomenon is the dramatic change in the nature equilibria with small changes in the
network structure. Addition of edges, for instance, affects the incentives of the agents
that are joined by the edge, but this effect propagates through the network, resulting in
more far-ranging effects whose total effect is not easy to ascertain. Our motivation in
this paper is that these characteristics make it challenging for a principal or a system
planner to ascertain outcomes of this interaction and significantly hampers the planner’s
ability to design interventions that could alter outcomes. For instance, if the actions of
the players are investment levels, a system planner may be interested in knowing the
total aggregate investment that can result from such interactions. If the actions of the
players are the propensity for crime, a planner may be interested in devising structural
changes to the network to reduce the total crime levels. Bramoullé et al. observed in [3]
that the minimum eigenvalue of the graph is a key characteristic that tells us when the
equilibrium would be unique. However, despite this result, not much is understood about
aggregate play in such interactions. Our central contributions in this paper are theorems
that capture maximum aggregate play and welfare in terms of graph characteristics. This
allows maximum aggregate play and welfare (over all equilibria) to be assessed only from
the graph structure, without enumeration of all equilibria, thereby significantly reducing
the complexity of the planner’s problem.
We characterize the maximum aggregate play in strategic interactions on networks
within a small band for the model discussed in Bramoullé et al. [3]. In this model,
players are situated on nodes of a network and choose actions to maximize their benefit
less the cost of their effort. The benefit a player derives is a function of the sum of its
own effort and the total of the effort of his neighbors, where the latter is discounted
by a substitutability factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, unit effort by a neighbor j of a player i is
substitutable by ‘δ’ units of effort by player i, as far as the benefit of player i is concerned.
Such a model applies to studying how firms involved in similar kinds of research choose
the amount of investment and effort when the interaction structure is given by a network.
We view the case of perfect substitutability (δ = 1) as the base case and δ ∈ (0, 1) as
a small perturbation from this case. We show that for δ greater than an explicit constant
η(G) < 1 that depends only on the underlying graph G, the maximum aggregate play
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over all equilibria is within e∗α(G) and e∗
(
α(G) + 1 + 1
α(G)−1
)
. Here α(G) is the size of
the largest independent of the graph G (called independence number), and e∗ is the level
of action at which marginal benefit equals marginal cost. We also identify the structure of
the aggregate play maximizing equilibrium. In the special case when a unique maximum
independent set exists in the underlying network, we provide the exact value of maximum
aggregate play; indeed it is e∗α(G). We also obtain similar bounds on the maximum
welfare attained by any equilibrium. When the underlying network is a tree (a graph
without cycles), we obtain explicit formulae for the maximum aggregate play and welfare
irrespective of the requirement that δ ≥ η(G). Thus, using our results the planner need
only calculate certain underlying graph parameters, such as the size of the maximum
independent, size of the largest clique and know the degree distribution of the nodes, and
these suffice to estimate maximum aggregate play and maximum welfare.
These results also show that alterations to the graph structure that do not change
these graph parameters have limited effect on the maximum aggregate play and welfare.
In particular, notice that deletion of nodes does not increase the independence number,
and hence, is not likely to have a significant effect on the maximum aggregate play.
However, deletion of edges can increase the independence number, making deletion of
edges the more effective strategy at improving aggregate play.
Part of this paper can be viewed as a logical generalization of previous results in [7]
which consider the case δ = 1, and indeed for δ = 1, our results reduce to those in
[7]. However, this generalization is significantly harder to accomplish mathematically.
When δ < 1 the nature of equilibria is drastically different from that when δ = 1.
The source of the hardness is that when δ < 1, no canonical classes of equilibria (like
specialized equilibria) are known. In particular, maximal independent sets do not, in
general, correspond to equilibria of the game. We address this challenge by noticing that
equilibria of this game correspond to solutions of a suitably defined linear complementarity
problem (LCP) [5]. In our recent work [4], we characterized ℓ1 norm maximizing solutions
of this linear complementarity problem and identified the existence of α(G) independent
cliques that support such solutions. Independent cliques are a set of cliques in the graph
such that no two nodes from two distinct cliques are adjacent. They can be thought of
as a generalization of independent sets and reduce to the latter when the said cliques
are single vertices. We show in [4] via a constructive algorithm that such cliques that
support an LCP solution necessarily exist in any graph. When translated to the game in
consideration here, these correspond to Nash equilibria where agents that make a non-
zero effort form a set of independent cliques and in each such clique, all agents have
identical actions. Such equilibria, that we call independent clique equilibria, maximize
aggregate play. When δ = 1, these cliques become degenerate singletons and we recover
the result of [7]. The requirement of δ ≥ η(G) is inherited from [4] and is necessary for
the existence of such independent cliques.
For the case when the underlying graph is a tree, we provide bounds on the aggregate
play and welfare which hold for a larger range of δ and depend only on the number of
nodes and their degree. We first provide such bounds for the case when the underlying
graph is a line network. A line network (chain) is a network whose nodes can be listed
as 1, 2, . . . , n such that the links are {i, i + 1} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Then we consider
starlike trees which are defined as trees with exactly one node of degree strictly greater
than 2. Using these as the building blocks, we give tight bounds on maximum aggregate
play and welfare for general trees.
3
1.1 Organisation of the paper
In Section 2, we provide some definitions from graph theory and provide the model of
the strategic interactions game we will work with. We also state a result relating the
Nash equilibria of this game to an LCP. In Section 3, we give bounds on the maximum
aggregate play for general networks by defining Independent Clique Equilibria (ICE). We
also give approximations of the maximum welfare by relating it to maximum aggregate
play and using the bounds derived on it. In Section 4, we consider the case when the
underlying network structure is a tree and provide bounds on the maximum aggregate
play and welfare independent of the results of Section 3. We conclude the paper in
Section 5.
2 Model
We consider the model of strategic interaction over networks as discussed in [3]. A
network or graph G = (V,E) is defined by a set of nodes V and a set of links or edges
E ⊆ V × V . Two nodes i, j ∈ V are said to be neighbours of each other or adjacent to
each other if (i, j) ∈ E. The neighbourhood of a node i in network G, denoted by NG(i),
is the set of all nodes which are adjacent to i. A path from node i to node j in a network
is a sequence of distinct nodes v0 (= i), v1, . . . , vm (= j) which begins with i and ends
with j such that (vk, vk+1) is a link for k = 1, . . . , m. For a network G on n nodes, let
A ∈ {0, 1}n×n denote its adjacency matrix: i.e.,
aij := A(i, j) =
{
1, if (i, j) ∈ E(G)
0, otherwise
Now we define the concept of an independent set, which is essential to give charac-
terizations of aggregate play maximizing equilibria. An independent set of a network is
defined as a set of nodes such that no two of them are adjacent. A k-dominating set
is defined as a set of nodes S such that all nodes which are not in S have at least k
neighbours in S, i.e. |NG(i) ∩ S| ≥ k ∀i 6∈ S. An independent set which is 1-dominating
is called a maximal independent set. A maximum independent set is an independent set
which has the highest cardinality amongst all independent sets. The cardinality of a
maximum independent set in G is denoted by α(G) and is also called the independence
number of the network G. A clique of a network is defined as a set of nodes such that
there exists an edge between any two nodes in this set. For a vector x indexed by V (G),
let σ(x) be its support, i.e.
σ(x) := {i ∈ V (G)|xi > 0}.
Let 1S denote the characteristic vector of set S, i.e.
1S(i) := (1S)i =
{
1, if i ∈ S
0, otherwise.
We consider the set of agents to be the set of nodes V of a network G with |V | = n.
Each agent simultaneously chooses a scalar action xi ≥ 0. We denote the vector of efforts
of all agents as x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and by x−i the efforts of all agents except i. The utility
of an agent depends on its own action and those of its neighbours. A substitutability
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factor δ determines how much the effort of an agent affects the utility of its neighbour.
Let the utility of agent i be denoted by Ui(xi, x−i;G, δ).
Ui(xi, x−i;G, δ) = b
(
xi + δ
∑
j∈V
aijxj
)
− cxi,
where b(·) is a differentiable strictly concave increasing benefit function and c > 0 is the
marginal cost. Each agent i chooses action xi to maximize its own utility. We denote
the best response of agent i by fi(x−i;G, δ), i.e. it represents the action which maximizes
Ui(·, x−i;G, δ) given x−i, G and δ. It is easy to see that
fi(x−i;G, δ) =
{
e∗ − δ
∑
j∈V aijxj, if δ
∑
j∈V aijxj < e
∗,
0, if δ
∑
j∈V aijxj ≥ e
∗,
(1)
where e∗ is such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost at e∗, i.e. b′(e∗) = c.
The best response can be succinctly written as
fi(x−i;G, δ) = max{0, e∗ − δ
∑
j∈V
aijxj} (2)
Our results apply to all games where the best response is of the above ‘max-linear’ form.
Thus, an agent has an incentive to make positive effort if and only if the sum of the
efforts of his neighbors is strictly less than e∗/δ; else the agent makes 0 effort.
2.1 Characterization of Nash equilibria of the game
A Nash equilibrium is a profile of efforts x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) for which x
∗
i = fi(x
∗
−i;G, δ)
for all agents i ∈ V . The set of Nash equilibria of the game is denoted by NEδ(G).
We now provide a characterization of the Nash equilibria of the game using a linear
complementarity problem. To this end, we define
Ci(x) := xi + δ
∑
j∈V
aijxj = xi + δ
∑
j∈NG(i)
xj
and call it the discounted sum of the closed neighbourhood of i with respect to x. We also
call Ci(x) − xi as the discounted sum of open neighbourhood of i with respect to x. Let
C(x) denote the column vector (C1(x), C2(x), . . . , Cn(x)). Then, C(x) = (I+ δA)x where I
denotes the n× n identity matrix and A denotes the adjacency matrix of the network G.
x is an equilibrium of the above game if xi = fi(x−i;G, δ) ∀i ∈ V . From (2) it is evident
that x is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if x satisfies
1. xi = 0 and Ci(x) ≥ e
∗.
2. xi > 0 and Ci(x) = e
∗
These conditions can be equivalently written as
xi ≥ 0, Ci(x) ≥ e
∗, xi(Ci(x)− e∗) = 0 ∀i ∈ V.
In the vector form these conditions are equivalent to
x ≥ 0, C(x) ≥ e∗e, x⊤(C(x)− e∗e) = 0, (3)
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where e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) is the vector of 1’s.
Conditions in (3) correspond to that of a linear complementarity problem. Given any
matrix M ∈ Rn×n and a vector q ∈ Rn, LCP(M, q) is the following problem:
Find x ∈ Rn such that x ≥ 0, y = Mx + q ≥ 0, y⊤x = 0.
The vector x is called a solution of this problem. Let SOL(LCP(M, q)) denote the set
of x such that x solves the LCP(M, q). Specifically, for M = I + δA and q = −e,
LCP(I + δA,−e) is given by
Find x ∈ Rn such that x ≥ 0, (I + δA)x ≥ e, ((I + δA)x− e)⊤x = 0.
We denote LCP(I + δA,−e) by LCPδ(G) and the set of its solutions by SOLδ(G). The
relation between Nash equilibria of the game and the solutions of LCPδ(G) are given by
the following theorem, which follows immediately from (3).
Theorem 2.1. An action profile x is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if
1
e∗
x ∈ SOLδ(G).
The authors in [2] considered a special case of the game with δ = 1. They found a
class of Nash equilibria, called specialized equilibria, in which each agent exerts either the
maximum effort e∗ (called specialists) or no effort (such agents were called free-riders).
They proved that a profile is a specialized Nash equilibrium if and only if the specialists
form a maximal independent set of the underlying network. We note that such a result
is not true for the more general game we consider. In conjunction with Theorem 2.1
and [4, Lemma 3.2], it can be shown that a profile is a specialized Nash equilibrium (as
defined in [2]), if and only if the specialists form a ⌈1
δ
⌉-dominating independent set of
the underlying network. A network may not have a ⌈1
δ
⌉-dominating independent set, in
which no specialized equilibrium can exist.
2.2 The game with δ = 1
When we take the substitutability factor δ as unity, the model reduces to the game of
provision of non-excludable public goods in the presence of a network as considered in
[2]. We review some results related to this model here.
Define the concavity of the benefit function as
ρ =
b(ne∗)− b(e∗)
c(n− 1)e∗
. (4)
The welfare is defined as
W (x;G) =
∑
i∈V
b
(
xi +
∑
j∈NG(i)
xj
)
− c
∑
i∈V
xi
for an effort profile x when the underlying network is G. Bramoullé and Kranton prove
the following proposition on comparing the welfare of two effort profiles under suitable
conditions on ρ.
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Proposition 2.2. Consider two effort profiles x1 and x2 on G. Then there exists ρ′ <
1 such that for fixed b(e∗) and b′(e∗), and ρ > ρ′, we have W (x1;G) > W (x2;G) if∑
i∈V dix
1
i >
∑
i∈V dix
2
i , where di is the degree of node i.
The authors of [7] took this work further and proved that the effort maximizing
equilibrium among all equilibria is a specialized equilibrium. They proved that the
maximum weighted effort amongst all equilibria was attained by a specialized equilib-
rium. Here, the weighted effort of effort profile x ∈ Rn is defined as
∑
i∈V wixi, where
w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) > 0 denotes the set of weights. We state some of the results of [7]
below.
The first theorem we recall from [7] proves that the maximum weighted effort in a
public goods game is achieved by a specialized equilibrium and characterizes that spe-
cialized equilibrium which achieves the maximum. It uses the notion of a w-weighted
maximum independent set. Given a set of weights w = (w1, w2, . . . , w|V ), the weight of
an independent set S ⊆ V is defined as
∑
i∈S wi. An independent with the maximum
weight is called a w-weighted maximum independent set and the maximum value is called
the w-weighted independence number, denoted by αw(G).
Theorem 2.3. Consider a public goods game over a network G, with w = (w1, w2, . . . , w|V )
denoting the set of weights and wi > 0 ∀i ∈ V . If S
∗ is a w-weighted maximum inde-
pendent set, then the specialized equilibrium in which all agents in S∗ are specialists and
others free ride is an effort maximizing equilibrium.
The authors of [7] also proved that the maximum weighted welfare in a public goods
game is achieved by a specialized equilibrium in a limiting case as the concavity of the
benefit function, as defined in (4), tends to 1. They also provide expressions for the
maximum weighted welfare in terms of the weighted independence number of the network
for the same. The weighted welfare in a public goods game is defined as Ww(x;G) =∑
i∈V wib(xi +
∑
j∈NG(i) xj) − c
∑
i∈V wixi, where w = (w1, w2, . . . , w|V |) denotes the set
of weights.
Theorem 2.4. Consider a public goods game over a network G without isolated agents
and w = (w1, w2, . . . , w|V ) denoting the set of weights with wi > 0 ∀i ∈ V . If S∗ is a
Aw-weighted maximum independent set, where A is the adjacency matrix of the network
G and let x∗ be the specialized equilibrium in which all agents in S∗ are specialists and
others free ride. Then, as ρ→ 1, the welfare of x∗ approaches the maximum equilibrium
welfare.
lim
ρ→1
W ∗w = lim
ρ→1
Ww(x
∗) = n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + ce∗αAw.
The specialized equilibrium corresponding to the Aw-weighted maximum independent
set was referred to as the influential equilibrium. The authors in [7] also consider the
case where ρ→ 0, in which another specialized equilibrium, called the frugal equilibrium
gives the maximum welfare.
2.3 Results on LCPδ(G)
In this section, we prove some results on the solutions of LCPδ(G) and we recall some
results from [4] on the solutions of LCPδ(G) which we use extensively in our analysis.
We first prove that if we restrict the network to all nodes except one which contributed
0 in a solution, then the restricted vector is a solution of the LCPδ(G
′), where G′ is
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the restricted network. We also prove that if a network is a disjoint union of connected
components [8], [1], any solution restricted to a component is a solution of the LCP on
the network being that component.
Lemma 2.1. Consider LCPδ(G) and let x ∈ SOLδ(G). Then,
a. If xi = 0 for some i ∈ V (G), then x−i ∈ SOLδ(G′), where G′ = G−i i.e. network G
restricted to all nodes except i.
b. If G = ∪ki=1Gi, where G1, . . . , Gk are connected components of G, then xGi ∈
SOLδ(Gi) for i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. We know that x satisfies xj ≥ 0, xj+δ
∑
m∈NG(j) xm ≥ 1 and xj(xj+δ
∑
m∈NG(j) xm−
1) = 0 ∀j ∈ V (G).
a. Since xi = 0, we have
∑
m∈NG(j) xm =
∑
m∈NG′ (j) xm ∀j ∈ V (G
′). Thus, for y = x−i
we have yj ≥ 0, yj + δ
∑
m∈NG′ (j) ym ≥ 1 and yj(yj + δ
∑
m∈NG′ (j) ym − 1) = 0 ∀j ∈
V (G′) giving x−i ∈ SOLδ(G′).
b. We note that
∑
m∈NG(j) xm =
∑
m∈NGi (j) xm ∀j ∈ V (Gi) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. This is
because NG(j) = NGi(j) ∀j ∈ V (Gi) since all nodes in a component have neighbours
only in that component. Thus, for y = xGi we have yj ≥ 0, yj + δ
∑
m∈NGi (j) ym ≥ 1
and yj(yj + δ
∑
m∈NGi (j)
ym − 1) = 0 ∀j ∈ V (Gi) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} giving xGi ∈
SOLδ(Gi) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
We now define Independent Clique Solutions (ICS), a concept introduced in [4] which
forms the basis of our analysis.
Definition 2.1. An Independent Clique Solution (ICS) is a vector in R|V | which is a
solution of the LCPδ(G) for some δ < 1 and its support is a union of independent cliques,
where two cliques in a network are said to be independent if no node of one clique has
any node of the other clique as its neighbour.
The set of all independent clique solutions of LCPδ(G) is denoted by ICSδ(G). An
algorithm to find these solutions has been given in [4]. The input to this algorithm is
the network which underlies the game, a maximum independent set of the network and
the substitutability factor δ. Since a maximum independent set always exists for any
graph, ICSs of LCPδ(G) exist for any G and suitable δ. The algorithm iterates over
nodes of the given maximum independent set and for each node (say i), the solution
support is updated from that node to a clique involving i’s neighbours which have only
i as a neighbour in the maximum independent set. The results of [4] dictate that if the
support of an ICS is the set of independent cliques given by K = {C1, C2, . . . , C|K|}, then
the ICS supported on K, if it exists, is given by
xi =
{
1
1+(|Cj |−1)δ , if i ∈ Cj, Cj ∈ K
0, otherwise.
The authors of [4] have proved that the solution which maximizes the ℓ1 amongst the
independent clique solutions also maximizes the ℓ1 amongst all solutions. The ℓ1 norm of
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a vector x is defined as the sum of all elements of x, denoted by ||x||1, i.e. ||x||1 =
∑
i∈V xi.
These results hold in a certain range of δ which is defined using η(G) given below
η(G) = max
{ω(G)− 3 +√(ω(G)− 3)2 + 4(ω(G)− 1)
2(ω(G)− 1)
, (5)
α(G)(ω(G)− 1)− ω(G)
α(G)(ω(G)− 1)
}
.
Theorem 2.5. Let δ ∈ [η(G), 1], and let x∗ ∈ ICSδ(G) be an ICS that maximizes
∑
i∈V xi
amongst all x ∈ ICSδ(G). Then x
∗ also maximizes
∑
i∈V yi amongst all y ∈ SOLδ(G).
We also use a corollary of the above theorem for the special case of networks in
which unique maximum independent sets exist. In such a case, it is proved that the
characteristic vector of the unique maximum independent set maximizes the ℓ1 norm
amongst all solutions.
Corollary 2.6. Let G be a graph with a unique maximum independent set S. Then, for
δ ∈ [η(G), 1], 1S maximizes the ℓ1 norm amongst all solutions of LCPδ(G).
With this we conclude our background. We now proceed to the main results of the paper.
3 Aggregate play and welfare
In this section, we first find tight lower and upper bounds on the maximum aggregate
play in terms of the properties of the network (Section 3.1). Then we use these bounds
to approximate the maximum welfare (Section 3.2).
3.1 Maximum aggregate play
In this section, we bound the maximum aggregate play attainable in any equilibrium
within limits that depend on α(G). In addition, we identify the structure of an aggregate
play maximizing equilibrium. We first discuss a lower bound on the maximum aggregate
play which holds for all networks and all values of δ. Then, we give a general form of the
aggregate play maximizing solution for any network under suitable conditions on δ. For
this, we use the results of [4], wherein the concept of independent clique solutions (ICS),
which are a special class of solutions of LCPδ(G) was introduced. Through this, we get an
absolute upper bound on the maximum aggregate play depending on the independence
number of the network.
The aggregate effort under a strategy profile x is defined as the sum over efforts of all
nodes of the given graph G, i.e.
E(x;G) :=
∑
i∈V
xi
Let E∗(δ, G) denote the maximum aggregate play over all equilibria. We first ask, how
large can E∗(δ, G) be? In particular, does the maximum aggregate play display any
monotonicity with δ? We find that with decrease in δ the maximum aggregate play
increases. As δ decreases the efforts of neighbors contribute lesser to the benefit of
a player, forcing the player to compensate with higher effort himself. As a result, in
equilibrium, players on the whole make higher effort. This was shown in [3, Prop 8].
9
Theorem 3.1. Let E∗(δ, G) be the maximium aggregate play of the game with parameter
δ and network G. If δ′ ≥ δ,
E∗(δ′, G) ≤ E∗(δ, G).
Combining this result with Theorem 2.3, we get an an absolute lower bound on the
maximum aggregate effort.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the game with substitutability parameter δ < 1 and network G.
Then we have,
E∗(δ, G) ≥ e∗α(G),
where α(G) is the independence number of the graph.
Proof. From Theorem 3.1, the maximum aggregate play for any game with δ ≤ 1 will
be at least as much as the maximum aggregate play in the case when δ = 1. For δ = 1,
we know from Theorem 2.3 that the maximum aggregate play is e∗α(G). Thus, the
maximum aggregate play for δ ≤ 1 at least e∗α(G).
3.1.1 Independent Clique Equilibria (ICE)
We have seen that the aggregate play increases with a decrease in δ. We now study how
aggregate play maximizing equilibria change as δ decreases below unity. It is instructive to
begin this discussion with the simplest case – when the underlying network is a complete
graph (every pair of nodes has an edge between them).
Consider a complete graph G with n nodes and with δ = 1. For this case, the
specialized equilibrium in which any one agent, say agent 1, plays e∗ and others free-ride
is an equilibrium. Indeed, this also is an aggregate play maximizing equilibrium yielding
aggregate play e∗. There is also a distributed equilibrium in which all agents make effort
to e
∗
n
, and this also yields the same aggregate play. Now consider δ < 1. In this case,
the agents other than agent 1, who were free-riders when δ was 1, cannot continue to
free-ride, since LCP conditions (3) do not hold. In fact, no equilibrium exists in which
free-riding is allowed. Consequently, erstwhile free-riders must now exert positive effort.
This, in turn, means that the erstwhile specialist agent 1 can reduce its effort, and makes
effort strictly less than e∗. The aggregate play maximizing equilibrium now involves all
agents making effort equal to e
∗
1+(n−1)δ . The resulting maximum aggregate play is
ne∗
1+(n−1)δ ,
which for δ < 1 is strictly larger than the maximum aggregate play for δ = 1.
Example 3.1. Figure 1 shows a complete network with 4 nodes. Consider a maximum
independent set of the graph in Figure 1, say S = {1}. Then, e∗1S = (e∗, 0, 0, 0) is an
equilibrium for the game with δ = 1.
When δ < 1, e∗1S is no longer an equilibrium of the game. This is because, for every
node other than {1}, the net play observed is δe∗ and since δe∗ < e∗ the equilibrium
conditions are not satisfied. Thus nodes other than node 1 have to contribute positively.
This provides incentive to node {1} to contribute lesser than e∗. To formally prove
that each node contributes a positive amount in any equilibrium, assume any one node
(say 4) to contribute 0 and others to contribute x1, x2, x3 respectively. Then, using the
equilibrium conditions on 4, we have
δ(x1 + x2 + x3) ≥ e
∗. (6)
Without loss of generality, we assume x1 is non-zero since all cannot play 0. Now, the
equilibrium conditions on 1 dictate C1(x) = e
∗, i.e. e∗ = x1 + δ(x2 + x3). Thus using
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Figure 1: Example of a complete support equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Example of an independent clique equilibrium (ICE). The support is represented
by dark nodes and the nodes with a bold outline denote a related maximum independent
set which is the support of an example solution when δ = 1.
(6), we get e∗ ≥ e∗ + x1(1 − δ), which is not possible. Thus, each node contributes a
positive amount. It is then easy to see that the only equilibrium is one in which each node
contributes equally x =
(
e∗
1+3δ
, e
∗
1+3δ
, e
∗
1+3δ
, e
∗
1+3δ
)
. The aggregate play is now 4e
∗
1+3δ
> e∗. 
We find that this phenomenon occurs more generally in all networks. When δ = 1,
the specialized equilibrium supported by a maximum independent set maximizes aggre-
gate play (thanks to Theorem 2.3). When δ < 1, certain neighbors of specialists in this
equilibrium, who where free-riders for δ = 1, exert positive effort and all specialists in
turn reduce their effort. For δ < 1 but close to unity, the aggregate play maximizing equi-
librium is supported on α(G)-many cliques, each containing one node from the aforesaid
maximum independent set. We illustrate this through the example below.
Example 3.2. Consider the network in Figure 2 and the maximal independent set
formed by the highlighted nodes, S = {1, 6, 9, 10}. Then, e∗1S = (e∗, 0, 0, 0, 0, e∗, 0, 0, e∗, e∗)
is an equilibrium for the game with δ = 1.
When δ < 1, e∗1S is no longer an equilibrium of the game. This is because, for
nodes 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 the net effort is δe∗ and since δe∗ < e∗ the equilibrium conditions
are not satisfied. We notice that one equilibrium is given by x =
(
e∗
1+2δ
, e
∗
1+2δ
, e
∗
1+2δ
, 0,
e∗
1+δ
, e
∗
1+δ
, 0, e
∗
1+δ
, e
∗
1+δ
, e∗
)
.
Since the all the nodes connecting the network restricted to {1, 2, 3} to the other parts
of the network contribute 0, we can isolate the nodes {1, 2, 3} and the corresponding
restricted network and analyze its equilibrium conditions. Note that amongst {1, 2, 3},
{2} and {3} have only one neighbour in the independent set S. Thus, for δ < 1 with only
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x1 = e
∗ and x2 = x3 = 0, equilibrium conditions are not satisfied. This provides them
incentive to contribute positively. Since this is true for every node in the independent
set, the support of the solution blows up from an independent set to set of independent
cliques. 
We formalize this notion of blowing up of independent nodes into cliques by defining a
special class of equilibria which we call independent clique equilibria (ICE). The definition
of ICE is based on the independent clique solutions (ICS), defined in Section 2.3.
Definition 3.1. An Independent Clique Equilibrium (ICE) is an action profile x ∈ R|V |
such that 1
e∗
x is an ICS of LCPδ(G).
Thus, given the support as a union of independent cliques K = {C1, C2, . . . , C|K|},
the only possible ICE is given by
xi =
{
1
1+(|C|−1)δe
∗, if i ∈ C, C ∈ K
0, otherwise.
The class of ICEs with α(G) cliques is aggregate play maximizing.
Theorem 3.3. For any network G, if δ ≥ η(G), then the maximum aggregate play
amongst the Nash equilibria of the game is achieved by an independent clique equilibrium
with α(G) cliques, where η(G) is as defined in Section 2.3.
Proof. From Theorem 2.1, we know that x is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if
1
e∗
x is a solution of LCPδ(G). From Theorem 2.5, we know that the ℓ1 norm maximizing
solution of LCPδ(G) is an independent clique solution (say y). Hence, the aggregate play
maximizing Nash equilibrium of the game is e∗y, an ICE.
Theorem 3.3 shows that the maximum aggregate play is achieved by an ICE. We have
also seen from Theorem 3.2 that the maximum aggregate play is at least e∗α(G). The
following theorem shows that it is not much larger for δ ≥ η(G).
Theorem 3.4. Consider the game with substitutability parameter δ ∈ [η(G), 1] and net-
work G. Then we have,
e∗α(G) ≤ E∗(δ, G) ≤ e∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
where α(G) is the independence number of the graph.
We now consider the special case of networks for which a unique maximum indepen-
dent set exists. In this case, the cliques that specialist nodes blowup into must contain
only the specialist node. If not, by choosing distinct nodes from any one clique would
yield distinct maximum independent sets, contradicting uniqueness. In this case, under
suitable conditions on δ, the characteristic vector of the unique maximum independent
set is an equilibrium and it is aggregate play maximizing. Moreover, the aggregate play
equals e∗α(G).
Theorem 3.5. If G has a unique maximum independent set (S), for δ ≥ η(G) then
the maximum aggregate play amongst the Nash equilibria of the game is e∗α(G) and is
achieved by the characteristic vector of S.
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Figure 3: A figure illustrating the definition of concavity.
Proof. From Theorem 2.1, we know that x is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if
1
e∗
x is a solution of LCPδ(G). From Corollary 2.6, we know that the ℓ1 norm maximizing
solution of LCPδ(G) is the characteristic vector of the unique maximum independent set
(1S). Hence, the aggregate play maximizing Nash equilibrium of the game is e
∗
1S and
the maximum aggregate play is given by e∗α(G).
3.2 Maximum welfare
We now derive approximations to the maximum welfare. We consider only unweighted
welfare. The welfare is defined as
W (x; δ, G) =
∑
i∈V
b
(
xi + δ
∑
j∈NG(i)
xj
)
− c
∑
i∈V
xi
for an effort profile x when the underlying network is G. Let W ∗(δ, G) denote the maxi-
mum welfare over all equilibria.
To relate the welfare to aggregate play, we define the concavity σb of the payoff function
similar to that defined in [2] as follows.
σb :=
b(e∗ + δ(n− 1)e∗)− b(e∗)
c(n− 1)e∗δ
, (7)
where n is the number of agents. It is the slope of the secant between e∗ and e∗+δ(n−1)e∗
normalized by c so that σb < 1 (Figure 3). Note that since b(·) is increasing, we have
σb > 0. By strict concavity of b(·), we have
b(e∗+δ(n−1)e∗)−b(e∗)
δ(n−1)e∗ < b
′(e∗) = c, where the last
equality follows from the definition of e∗. Thus, we have 0 < σb < 1.
Our aim is to find approximations of welfare in terms of aggregate play and then
bound the welfare using bounds on aggregate play. The following inequality is central to
our analysis:
b(e∗) + cσb(Ci(x)− e∗) ≤ b(Ci(x)) ≤ b(e∗) + c(Ci(x)− e∗), (8)
for all i ∈ V , for any x that is an equilibrium of the game. To prove the first inequality
in (8), we note that since x is an equilibrium, Ci(x) ≤ e
∗ + δ(n − 1)e∗. Since b(·) is a
concave function, we have
b(e∗ + δ(n− 1)e∗)− b(e∗)
(n− 1)e∗δ
≤
b(Ci(x))− b(e
∗)
Ci(x)− e∗
,
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which implies b(e∗)+cσb(Ci(x)−e∗) ≤ b(Ci(x)). Also, we know that c = b′(e∗) is the slope
of the tangent at e∗ and since b(·) is concave, the tangent lies above the secant giving,
b(Ci(x))− b(e
∗)
Ci(x)− e∗
< b′(e∗) = c,
which implies b(Ci(x)) ≤ b(e
∗) + c(Ci(x) − e∗). Thus, we have proved inequalities stated
in (8). Taking limits as σb tends to 1 in (8), fixing e
∗ and b′(e∗) we get
lim
σb→1
b(Ci(x)) = b(e
∗) + c(Ci(x)− e
∗). (9)
We now find approximations of the total welfare for a given Nash equilibrium using
expressions involving the total effort.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a network G with minimum and maximum degree dmin and dmax
respectively and substitutability factor δ ≥ η(G). Let x be a Nash equilibrium for such a
game. Then, we have
n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)
∑
i∈V
xi ≤W (x; δ, G), (10)
W (x; δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσb
∑
i∈V
xi. (11)
The above lemma shows that the welfare of any equilibrium can be bounded within
two linear functions of the aggregate effort of the equilibrium. Using Lemma 3.1 and
Theorem 3.4, we find bounds on the maximum welfare.
Theorem 3.6. Consider a strategic interactions game on a network G with minimum
and maximum degree dmin and dmax respectively and substitutability factor δ ≥ η(G).
Then, we have the following:
(a) For σb ∈ (0, 1), we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
. (12)
(b) For σb ≤
1
1+dminδ
, we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ+1)σb− 1)e∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
. (13)
(c) For σb ≥
1
1+dminδ
, we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)e∗α(G). (14)
(d) If G has a unique maximum independent set, we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe∗α(G)
and
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)e∗α(G),
∀σb ∈ (0, 1).
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(e) If G is a regular graph, i.e. dmax = dmin = d, then keeping b(e
∗) and b′(e∗) fixed and
letting σb → 1, we have
lim
σb→1
W ∗(δ, G) = n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdδe∗
∑
i∈V
x∗i , (15)
where x∗ denotes the aggregate effort maximizing equilibrium.
The bounds given in (12), (13) and (14) give good approximations to the maximum
total welfare so as to help a designer define the structure of interactions to get desirable
output. Taking the limit as concavity (σb) tends to 1 in (12) and (14), we have
lim
σb→1
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdminδe∗α(G).
and
lim
σb→1
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδe∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
.
We emphasize once again that the results in this and the following section significantly
simplify the problem of the principal of ascertaining maximum aggregate play and welfare
over all equilibria. Instead of searching over all equilibria, the principal only needs to
calculate certain characteristics of the underlying network, and these suffice to provide
good approximations on these aggregate quantities.
4 Aggregate effort and welfare for tree networks
An important assumption in the previous section was that δ ≥ η(G).We now find explicit
formulae for the aggregate effort and welfare for a game where the network does not have
cycles (i.e., trees), by only requiring that δ ≥ 1
2
.
Before we analyze the case of a tree, we first consider simpler cases. We begin with
a line network (chain). Then we consider starlike trees which are defined as trees with
exactly one node of degree strictly greater than 2. Using these as the building blocks, we
give an expression for a tight upper bound on the maximum aggregate effort for general
trees based on only the total number of nodes and degrees of each node. On getting the
bounds on maximum aggregate effort for trees, we find approximations to welfare using
Lemma 3.1.
4.1 Line networks
In this section, we consider the case of a line network with n nodes and find a tight upper
bound on the maximum aggregate play. A sample of such a network is shown in Figure 4.
We also show that when the line network has an odd number of nodes, the upper bound
is achieved.
Theorem 4.1. If G is a line network with n nodes and δ ≥ 1
2
, the maximum aggregate
play amongst Nash equilibria is at most n+1
2
e∗ and is at least n
2
e∗ , i.e.
n
2
e∗ ≤ E∗(δ, G) ≤
n+ 1
2
e∗.
Moreover, the upper bound is achieved for line networks with odd number of nodes.
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Figure 4: A line network with n nodes.
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Figure 5: A line network with 7 nodes for Example 4.3
Agent ↓ xI xII xIII xIV xV
1 e∗ −−δ
3+2 δ2+δ−1
2 δ4−4 δ2+1
1
1+δ
e∗ 1−δ2+δ+1e
∗ 1
1+δ
e∗
2 0 −−2 δ
3+δ2+2 δ−1
2 δ4−4 δ2+1
1
1+δ
e∗ 1−δ−δ2+δ+1e
∗ 1
1+δ
e∗
3 e∗
(δ−1) (δ2+δ−1)
2 δ4−4 δ2+1 0
1−δ
−δ2+δ+1e
∗ 0
4 0 − 2 δ−1
2 δ4−4 δ2+1 e
∗ 1
−δ2+δ+1e
∗ 1
−δ2+δ+1e
∗
5 e∗
(δ−1) (δ2+δ−1)
2 δ4−4 δ2+1 0 0
1−δ
−δ2+δ+1e
∗
6 0 −−2 δ
3+δ2+2 δ−1
2 δ4−4 δ2+1
1
1+δ
e∗ 1
1+δ
e∗ 1−δ−δ2+δ+1e
∗
7 e∗ −−δ
3+2 δ2+δ−1
2 δ4−4 δ2+1
1
1+δ
e∗ 1
1+δ
e∗ 1−δ2+δ+1e
∗
Validity → δ ∈ [0.5, 1] δ ∈ [
√
5−1
2
, 1] ∪ [0, 0.5] δ ∈ [
√
5−1
2
, 1] δ ∈ [ 1√
2
, 1] δ ∈ [ 1√
2
, 1]
Total → 4e∗ 8δ
3−6δ2−12δ+7
2 δ4−4 δ2+1 e
∗ e∗ + 4
1+δ
e∗ 6+4δ−4δ
2
1+δ−δ2 e
∗ 6+4δ−4δ2
1+δ−δ2 e
∗
Table 1: The validity row shows the range of δ for which the equilibrium holds. A table
showing all equilibria for a line network of 7 nodes.
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Figure 6: A star with n peripheral nodes.
We illustrate all equilibria of a line network of 7 nodes with an example given in
Figure 5.
Example 4.3. We consider the line network with 7 nodes in Figure 5. Let x =
(x1, x2, . . . , x7) denote a vector of plays. Table 1 shows all the equilibria and correspond-
ing aggregate effort of each of them.
From Theorem 4.1, the aggregate play is upper bounded by n+1
2
e∗ = 4e∗, for δ ≥ 1
2
.
Equilibrium I has aggregate play 4e∗ and hence it is the aggregate play maximizing
equilibrium. From Proposition 2 of [3], the game has a unique Nash equilibrium for
δ ≤ 1|λmin(A)| and
1
|λmin(A)| = 0.5412 in our case. Thus, for δ ≤ 0.5412, we have a unique
equilibrium. Specifically, for δ ≤ 1
2
, the only equilibrium is Equilibrium II. 
4.2 Stars and Starlike Networks
In this section, we consider the case when the interaction structure is a star-like network.
First, we show that, for a star with a central node (degree ≥ 2) and n peripheral nodes
(as shown in Figure 6), there is a unique equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2. If G is a star network with n (≥ 3) peripheral nodes and δ ≥ 1
n
, the game
has only one equilibrium in which all the peripheral nodes play action e∗ and the central
node free-rides. Thus, the maximum aggregate effort is ne∗.
Next, we consider a starlike network structure with peripherals coming out of the
central node (degree ≥ 3) themselves being chains instead of just single nodes. We
consider m chains S1, S2, . . . , Sm with n1, n2, . . . , nm nodes respectively having one leaf
node connected to a central node c and the other leaf node free. We find a tight upper
bound on the maximum aggregate play for such networks and also show that when all of
n1, n2, . . . , nm are odd, i.e. all peripheral chains have an odd number of nodes, the upper
bound is achieved.
Theorem 4.3. Let G be a star network having degG(c) = m (≥ 3) chains connected at a
central node c and for δ ≥ 1
2
and let the r out of the m chains have odd number of nodes.
Then, the maximum aggregate play amongst Nash equilibria is at most |V (G)|+m−1
2
e∗ and
at least |V (G)|+r−1
2
e∗ i.e.
|V (G)|+ r − 1
2
e∗ ≤ E∗(δ, G) ≤
|V (G)|+m− 1
2
e∗.
Moreover, the upper bound is achieved in the case of all chains are of odd length.
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Figure 7: A starlike networks with 7 nodes for Example 4.4
Agent ↓ xI xII xIII
1 e∗ δ+1
2δ+1
1
1+δ
e∗
2 0 1
2δ+1
1
1+δ
e∗
3 e∗ 1−δ
2δ+1
0
4 0 1
2δ+1
1
1+δ
e∗
5 e∗ δ+1
2δ+1
1
1+δ
e∗
6 0 1
2δ+1
1
1+δ
e∗
7 e∗ δ+1
2δ+1
1
1+δ
e∗
Validity → δ ∈ [1
2
, 1] δ ∈ [0, 1] δ ∈ [1
2
, 1]
Total → 4e∗ 2δ+7
2δ+1
e∗ 6
1+δ
e∗
Table 2: A table showing all equilibria for a starline network of 7 nodes.
18
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12
Figure 8: An example tree T
Example 4.4. As an example, we consider the network in Figure 7 which is a starlike
network with 7 nodes. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , x7) denote a vector of plays. Table 2 shows
all the equilibria and corresponding aggregate play of each of them.
From Theorem 4.3, the aggregate play is upper bounded by |V (G)|+m−1
2
= 7+3−1
2
=
4.5e∗, for δ ≥ 1
2
. On comparing the aggregate play of the three equilibria for δ ≥ 1
2
, we
get xI is the aggregate play maximizing equilibrium. We also note that the support of xI
forms a unique maximum independent set of G, which indicates it being aggregate effort
maximizing in [η(G), 1). From [3, Prop. 2], the game has a unique Nash equilibrium
for δ ≤ 1|λmin(A)| and
1
|λmin(A)| = 0.5 in our case. Thus, for δ ≤ 0.5, we have a unique
equilibrium. Speicifically, for δ ≤ 1
2
, the only equilibrium is xII and hence it is the
aggregate play maximizing equilibrium. 
4.3 Trees
For a general tree T , we define the centers of the tree as those nodes with degree ≥ 3.
Let the centers of a network T be CT = {c1, c2, . . . , ct} and let the degree of center ci in
tree T be denoted by dTi . We define a branch of a tree as a path that starts at a center
and ends either at a leaf or at another center without passing through another center.
We denote the set of branches of a tree by BT . In the next theorem, we give a bound on
the aggregate play of any Nash equilibrium of the game on a tree.
To illustrate the concept of a tree (say T ), its centers (CT ) and its branches (BT ), we
provide an example tree shown in Figure 8. The central nodes are CT = {2, 10, 3, 5} and
its branches are BT = {(2, 1), (2, 9), (10, 11), (10, 12), (3, 4, 5), (5, 8), (5, 6, 7)}.
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a tree (T ) with CT = {c1, c2, . . . , ct} as the set of centers (CT 6= ∅)
and let δ ≥ 1
2
. Let the total number of branches of T be denoted by m(= |BT |) and let r
be the number of odd length branches. Then, the maximum aggregate play amongst Nash
equilibria is at most |V (G)|+m−|CT |
2
e∗ and at least |V (G)|+r−|CT |
2
e∗,i.e.
|V (G)|+ r − |CT |
2
e∗ ≤ E∗(δ, G) ≤
|V (G)|+m− |CT |
2
e∗.
Moreover, the bound is tight in the case when all branches have an odd number of nodes.
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Figure 9: A tree with tight bounds for Example 4.5
Agent ↓ xI xII
1 e∗ δ
2+δ−1
4 δ2−1
2 0 3 δ−1
4 δ2−1
3 e∗ δ
2+δ−1
4 δ2−1
4 e∗ −2 δ
2−2 δ+1
4 δ2−1
5 0 3 δ−1
4 δ2−1
6 e∗ δ
2+δ−1
4 δ2−1
7 e∗ δ
2+δ−1
4 δ2−1
Validity → δ ∈ [1
3
, 1] δ ∈ [0, 1
3
]
Total → 5e∗ 2δ
2+12δ−7
4δ2−1 e
∗
Table 3: A table showing all equilibria for a tree network of 7 nodes.
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Example 4.5. As an example, we consider the network in Figure 9 which is a line
network with 7 nodes. Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , x7) denote a vector of plays. Table 3 shows
all the equilibria and corresponding aggregate play of each of them.
Note that for this example, centers are CT = {2, 5} and the branches are BT =
{(2, 1), (2, 3), (5, 6), (5, 7), (2, 4, 5)}. From Theorem 4.4, the aggregate play is at most
|V (G)|+m−|CT |
2
e∗ = 7+2+2−1
2
e∗ = 5e∗, for δ ≥ 1
2
. On comparing the aggregate play of
the three equilibria for δ ≥ 1
2
, we get xI is the aggregate play maximizing equilibrium.
From Proposition 2 of [3], the game has a unique Nash equilibrium for δ ≤ 1|λmin(A)| and
1
|λmin(A)| = 0.5 in our case. Thus, for δ ≤ 0.5, we have a unique equilibrium. Speicifically,
for δ ≤ 1
3
, the only equilibrium is xII and hence it is aggregate play maximizing. Also,
for δ ∈ [1
3
, 1
2
], the only equilibrium is xI and thus it is aggregate play maximizing.

In the next theorem, using the bounds on aggregate play found for trees, we find
bounds on the welfare for trees.
Theorem 4.5. Consider a strategic interactions game on a tree T with maximum degree
dmax, centers CT = {c1, c2, . . . , ct} (CT 6= ∅) and substitutability factor δ ≥
1
2
. Let the
number of branches of T be m and the number of odd branches be r. Then, we have the
following:
(a) For σb ∈ (0, 1), we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe
∗
(
|V (G)|+m− |CT |
2
)
.
(b) For σb ≤
1
1+δ
, we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((δ + 1)σb − 1)e∗
(
|V (G)|+m− |CT |
2
)
.
(c) For σb ≥
1
1+δ
, we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((δ + 1)σb − 1)e∗
(
|V (G)|+ r − |CT |
2
)
.
The results of Theorem 4.5 give us approximations of the social welfare in the case
the underlying network is a tree which depend only on a few characteristics of the un-
derlying network. These characteristics, namely the number of nodes, the number of
branches, number of centers are easily computable. We re-emphasize that, thanks to this
theorem, the problem of estimating the social welfare has become easier than computing
all equilibria and searching over all of them.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied games on networks with local contributions. The model is a
natural generalization from Bramoullé and Kranton’s ([2]) public goods game obtained
by the introduction of a substitutability factor. We provide results that aid a system
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planner in assessing aggregate outcomes and the network underlying the game to achieve
desirable outcomes in terms of social welfare.
Specifically, we show that under suitable assumptions on the substitutability factors,
the maximum aggregate effort is achieved by an independent clique equilibrium (ICE)
and give close approximations to the maximum aggregate play and welfare in terms of
graph characteristics. For trees, we provide approximations which are independent of the
independence number and depend only on the total number of vertices, degrees of each
node of the graph and the structure of the tree. These approximations provide a social
planner with a hand on what outcome can be expected if the network underlying the
game is chosen in a certain way.
Our work opens up directions for research on how the underlying graph may be edited
for ensuring desirable outcomes. Specifically, it provides guidelines on devising changes
to the network structure that would result in increases in welfare. It identifies maximum
and minimum degrees and independence number of the network as key characteristics
that affect the welfare. Thus one may surmise that changes to the network that affect
these characteristics are most effective in enhancing the welfare. A formal study of this
topic is part of our ongoing work.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.4
From Theorem 3.1, the maximum aggregate effort for any game with δ ≤ 1 will be at
least as much as that in the case when δ = 1. For δ = 1, we know from [7] that the
maximum aggregate effort is e∗α(G). Thus, the maximum aggregate play for δ ≤ 1 at
least e∗α(G).
From Theorem 3.3, we know that the maximum aggregate effort is achieved by an
independent clique equilibrium. We find an upper bound on the aggregate effort of any
independent clique equilibrium to get a upper bound on the maximum aggregate effort.
Let x be an independent clique equilibrium such that σ(x) = ∪
α(G)
i=1 Ci, where Ci are
independent cliques with |V (Ci)| = ni. Then, the aggregate effort of x is given by
∑
i∈V
xi =
α(G)∑
i=1
ni
1 + (ni − 1)δ
e∗. (16)
Each term in the RHS of (16) is increasing in ni and decreasing in δ. Thus, to find
the maximum value, we take all ni = ω(G), which is the size of the largest clique in the
network. We know that δ ≥ α(G)(ω(G)−1)−ω(G)
α(G)(ω(G)−1) , so we take δ =
α(G)(ω(G)−1)−ω(G)
α(G)(ω(G)−1) to find the
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bound. Substituting in (16), we get
∑
i∈V
xi =
α(G)∑
i=1
ni
1 + (ni − 1)δ
e∗
≤
α(G)ω(G)
1 + (ω(G)− 1)α(G)(ω(G)−1)−ω(G)
α(G)(ω(G)−1)
e∗
=
α(G)ω(G)
α(G)+α(G)ω(G)−α(G)−1
α(G)
e∗
=
α2(G)
α(G)− 1
e∗.
Thus, we have
∑
i∈V xi ≤
(
α(G) + 1 + 1
α(G)−1
)
e∗. Since this is true for all independent
clique equilibria with α(G) cliques, we have E∗(δ, G) ≤
(
α(G) + 1 + 1
α(G)−1
)
e∗. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
We first prove(10). From the first inequality in(8), we have
W (x; δ, G) =
∑
i∈V
(b(Ci(x))− cxi)
≥
∑
i∈V
(b(e∗)− ce∗ + c(σbCi(x)− xi))
= n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c
(
δσb
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijxj − (1− σb)
∑
i∈V
xi
)
≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)
∑
i∈V
xi. (17)
Here, (17) follows from the fact that
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V aijxj =
∑
i∈V dixi ≥ dmin
∑
i∈V xi, where
di denotes the degree of node i. Thus (10) is proved.
Next, we prove (11) using the second inequality in (8).
W (x; δ, G) =
∑
i∈V
(b(Ci(x))− cxi)
≤
∑
i∈V
(b(e∗)− ce∗ + c(Ci(x)− xi))
= n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cδ
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijxj
≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c(dmaxδσb)
∑
i∈V
xi. (18)
Here, (18) follows from
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V aijxj =
∑
i∈V dixi ≤ dmax
∑
i∈V xi, where di denotes
the degree of node i. Thus (11) is proved. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.6
Let the aggregate play maximizing ICE be given by x∗.
23
(a) We maximize the RHS of (11) over x to get
W (x; δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσb
∑
i∈V
x∗i
≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
(19)
(19) follows from Theorem 3.4. Since (19) holds for every x such that x
e∗
∈ SOLδ(G),
we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
.
(b) Since (10) holds for all x, we consider this equation for x∗, i.e.
W ∗(δ, G) ≥W (x∗; δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)
∑
i∈V
x∗i
For σb ≤
1
1+dminδ
, to minimize the lower bound, we need to consider the maximum
value of
∑
i∈V x
∗
i . Thus, we have for σb ≤
1
1+dminδ
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)e∗
(
α(G) + 1 +
1
α(G)− 1
)
.
(c) For σb ≥
1
1+dminδ
, to minimize the lower bound, we need to consider the minimum
value of
∑
i∈V x
∗
i . Thus, we have for σb ≥
1
1+dminδ
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)e∗α(G).
(d) In the case when unique maximum independent sets exist, Theorem 3.5 dictates
that the maximum aggregate play is e∗α(G). Using this value of
∑
i=1∈V x
∗
i in the
proof of Theorem 3.6, we get the bounds as
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe∗α(G)
and
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((dminδ + 1)σb − 1)e∗α(G).
(e) Notice that in the claim, σb is varied keeping b(e
∗) and b′(e∗) fixed. Consequently,
the set of equilibria of the game does not change with σb (see [7] for examples of
such a sequence of benefit functions), and hence x∗ does not depend on σb. Taking
the limit as σb → 1 in (10) we get,
lim
σb→1
W (x; δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdδ
∑
i∈V
xi.
Thus,
lim
σb→1
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ lim
σb→1
W (x∗; δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdδ
∑
i∈V
x∗i .
24
Next, taking the maximum over all x which are equilibria in (11) we get,
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdσbδ
∑
i∈V
x∗i ,
where x∗ is the aggregate effort maximizing equilibrium. Similarly for the upper
bound we have,
lim
σb→1
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdδ
∑
i∈V
x∗i ,
giving
lim
σb→1
W ∗(δ, G) = n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdδ
∑
i∈V
x∗i ,
as required. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
First, we prove the lower bound. From Theorem 3.2, we know that
∑
i∈V xi ≥ αe
∗,
where α is the independence number of the path. Now, we note that every tree is a
bipartite graph and for a bipartite graph with n nodes, we have α ≥ n
2
. Thus, we have∑
i∈V xi ≥ αe
∗ ≥ n
2
e∗.
We will prove the upper bound by induction. For the base case, note that for a
line network with just 1 node, the only equilibrium is itself contributing e∗, making the
aggregate play e∗ = 1+1
2
e∗ = n+1
2
e∗.
Let the aggregate play be upper bounded by k+1
2
e∗ for all line networks with number
of nodes equal to k < n. Let Pn denote the line network with n nodes. Let x denote an
equilibrium of the game on Pn and δ ≥
1
2
.
Case 1: σ(x) = V.
If an equilibrium has full support the discounted sum of efforts of the closed neighbour-
hood of each node is e∗, i.e. Ci(x) = e∗. Then,
n∑
i=1
Ci(x) =
n∑
i=1
xi + δ
n∑
i=1
xi + δ
n∑
i=1
xi − δ(x1 + xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1 and n are leaves
ne∗ + 2e∗δ ≥ (2δ + 1)
n∑
i=1
xi
n+ 1
2
e∗ ≥
n∑
i=1
xi,
where the last inequality follows since δ ≥ 1
2
. Thus, the aggregate play of an equilibrium
with full support is less than or equal n+1
2
e∗.
Case 2: σ(x) ⊂ V , a strict subset.
If the (r+1)th node is assumed to contribute zero, we get two disconnected subnetworks
Pr and Pn−1−r. Using Lemma 2.1, xPr is an equilibrium of the game with the network
as Pr and xPn−1−r is an equilibrium of the game with the network Pn−1−r. By induction
hypothesis, aggregate play of any equilibrium in Pr is less than or equal to
r+1
2
e∗ and
that of any equilibrium in Pn−1−r is less than or equal to n−r2 e
∗. Thus the total aggregate
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play is less than or equal to r+1
2
e∗ + n−r
2
e∗ = n+1
2
e∗. By the principle of mathematical
induction, the first part of the theorem is proved.
For the tightness of the bound, consider a line network with 2k+1 nodes and x2i+1 =
e∗ ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} is an equilibrium with aggregate effort 2k+1+1
2
e∗ = (k + 1)e∗. Hence,
we see that the bound is achieved for line networks with odd number of nodes. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Consider the star network G with n peripheral nodes and let x be an equilibrium of the
game with δ ≥ 1
n
. We again consider two cases.
Case 1: σ(x) = V.
Then, on solving the (I + δA)x = ee∗ , we get
x0 =
nδ − 1
nδ2 − 1
e∗ and x1 = x2 = · · · = xn =
δ − 1
nδ2 − 1
e∗
Since x0 and xi, i 6= 0 have opposite signs for all values of δ with δ ≥
1
n
, such an
equilibrium cannot exist.
Case 2: σ(x) ⊂ V , a proper subset
Note that, any vector x with xi = 0 where i is a peripheral node cannot be a Nash
equilibrium because the equilibrium conditions can’t be satisfied for the peripheral node
if it is contributing 0. Let x0 = 0, where 0 is the central node. Then the candidate
equilibrium x is x0 = 0 and xi = e
∗ ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. For this x, C0(x) = nδe∗ ≥ e∗ for
δ ≥ 1
n
. Hence, x is an equilibrium.
Hence, the only equilibrium in a star network is one in which all the peripheral nodes
play e∗ and the central node free-rides. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3
First, we prove the lower bound. From Theorem 3.2, we know that
∑
i∈V xi ≥ αe
∗, where
α is the independence number of the tree. Now, we note that for every chain, there exists
an independent set with n+1
2
nodes when n is odd and there exists an independent set
with n
2
nodes when n is even, where n is the number of nodes in the chain. We denote the
set of chains emanating from c as Pc = {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}. Then, combining independent
sets of every chain in Pc gives an independent set of the star network G. This is because
for any pair of nodes i ∈ Pi and j ∈ Pj (i 6= j), we have NG(i) ∩ {j} = ∅. Let |Pi| = ni
Thus, we have α ≥
∑
niis odd
(ni+1)+
∑
nj is even
(nj)
2
= |V (G)|+r−1
2
, since |V (G)| =
∑m
i=1 ni + 1.
Hence, |V (G)|+r−1
2
e∗ ≤
∑n
i=1 xi.
We will prove the upper bound by induction on the number of nodes. After showing
the result for a base case, we assume that the result holds for all stars smaller than T and
show that it holds for T . To do this, we divide our proof into different cases depending
on what the support of an aggregate effort maximizing equilibrium is. The first case is
when it is of full support. Here, we show the bound using some algebraic manipulation.
Next, we assume that the central node contributes 0. The result then follows by finding
upper bounds on paths using Theorem 4.1 and combining them. The final two cases are
when a neighbour of the central node contributes nothing or any other node along the
paths contribute 0. Here, we use the induction hypothesis and Theorem 4.1 to show the
results.
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First, for the base case, consider a star network with 3 peripheral nodes (m = 3).
The only equilibrium is when each peripheral node contributes e∗ and the central node
contributes 0 for δ ≥ 1
2
, and its aggregate play is 3e∗ = 4+3−1
2
e∗. Hence, our bound holds
for the base case.
Consider the star G having line networks S1, S2, . . . , Sm with n1, n2, . . . , nm nodes re-
spectively. Let x be an equilibrium with the network G.
Induction Hypothesis: Let δ ≥ 1
2
. Then, for all stars G′ with m′ (≥ 3) chains connected
at a central node c′ with |V (G′)| < |V (G)|, the aggregate play of a Nash equilibrium is
at most |V (G
′)|+m′−1
2
.
Case 1: σ(x) = V.
Let xc denote the action of the central node and x
i
l denote the action of the leaf of the
line network Si. If an equilibrium has full support the discounted sum of plays of the
closed neighbourhood of each node is e∗, i.e. Ci(x) = e∗. Then,∑
i∈V
Ci(x) =
∑
i∈V
xi + 2δ(
∑
i∈V
xi) + δ(xc)− δ(
m∑
i=1
xil)
|V (G)|e∗ +mδe∗
(2δ + 1)
≥
∑
i∈V
xi (taking worst case values of xc and x
i
l)
|V (G)|+ m
2
2
e∗ ≥
∑
i∈V
xi (since the LHS above is maximized at δ = 0.5)
|V (G)|+m− 1
2
e∗ ≥
∑
i∈V
xi,
where the last inequality is because m
2
≤ m− 1. Thus, the aggregate play of an equilib-
rium with full support is less than or equal to |V (G)|+m−1
2
e∗.
Case 2: σ(x) ⊂ V , a proper subset.
We divide this case into three separate cases. In each case, the on restricting the network
to all nodes except one, which contributes to 0, we get a few smaller disconnected sub-
networks of the original network. Using Lemma 2.1, x restricted to these networks is an
equilibrium of the game on these networks. Thus, finding upper bounds on the aggregate
effort of equilibria on these networks and adding them up gives an upper bound on the
aggregate effort of the original network.
Case 2a: xc = 0.
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get m disjoint line networks of
lengths n1, n2, . . . , nm. Applying Theorem 4.1 to each line network and adding the upper
bounds, we get the upper bound as
∑m
i=1 ni+m
2
e∗ = |V (G)|+m−1
2
e∗.
Case 2b: xk = 0 where k is the (r + 1)
th node from c, where nm − 1 ≥ r ≥ 1.
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get a star with m line networks
and |V (G)| − nm + r nodes and a line network of length nm − 1 − r. By the induction
hypothesis, since the new star has less number of nodes than G, and by Theorem 4.1, we
get the upper bound as |V (G)|−nm+r+m−1
2
e∗ + nm−1−r+1
2
e∗ = |V (G)|+m−1
2
e∗.
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Case 2c: The neighbour of the central node in Sm contributes 0.
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get a star with m− 1 peripheral
line networks with |V (G)| −nm nodes and a line network with nm− 1 nodes. For m ≥ 4,
by the induction hypothesis, since the new star-like network has fewer nodes than G, and
by Theorem 4.1, we get the upper bound as |V (G)|+(m−1)−1
2
e∗+ nm−1+1
2
e∗ = |V (G)|+m−2
2
e∗ ≤
|V (G)|+m−1
2
e∗. For m = 3, we get two disjoint line networks with |V (G)| − n3 and n3 − 1
nodes respectively, for which using Theorem 4.1 gives the upper bound as |V (G)|−n3+1
2
e∗+
n3−1+1
2
e∗ = |V (G)|+1
2
e∗ < |V (G)|−1+m
2
e∗.
Hence, the aggregate play is at most |V (G)|+m−1
2
e∗ for all equilibria. For the achievabil-
ity of the bound, consider x defined as follows with line networks of length 2k1+1, 2k2+
1, . . . , 2km + 1.
xc = 0,
xji =
{
e∗, if j is odd,
0, otherwise,
where xji is the contribution of the j
th node of the line network Si when we start counting
from the leaf. It can be seen that ||x||1 =
∑m
i=1 ki +m =
∑m
i=1 ni+m
2
e∗ = |V (G)|−1+m
2
e∗. 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4.4
First, we prove the lower bound. From Theorem 3.2, we know that E∗(δ, G) ≥ αe∗, where
α is the independence number of the tree. Now, we note that for every chain, there exists
an independent set with n+1
2
nodes when n is odd and there exists an independent set
with n
2
nodes when n is even, where n is the number of nodes in the chain. We denote
the set of branches as BT .The union of independent sets of every branch in BT gives an
independent set of the tree G. This is because for any pair of nodes i ∈ Bi and j ∈ Bj
(Bi and Bj are distinct chains from BT ), we have NG(i) ∩ {j} = ∅. Thus, we have α ≥∑
B∈BT :|B|is odd
(|B|+1)+∑B∈BT :|B| is even(|B|)
2
= |V (G)|+r−|CT |
2
, since |V (G)| =
∑
B∈BT |B| + |CT |.
Hence, |V (G)|+r−|CT |
2
e∗ ≤ E∗(δ, G).
We will prove the upper bound by induction on the number of nodes. We will prove
the upper bound by induction on the number of nodes. After showing the result for a
base case, we assume that the result holds for all stars smaller than T and show that it
holds for T . To do this, we divide our proof into different cases depending on what the
support of an aggregate effort maximizing equilibrium is. The case when the equilibrium
has full support is shown similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3. Next, we assume that one
of the central nodes contributes 0. The result then follows by finding upper bounds on
paths using Theorem 4.1, using mathematical induction on the disjoint trees formed by
restricting the graph to all nodes except the center contributing 0 and combining them.
The next two cases are when the neighbour of a central node in a branch terminating in a
leaf contributes 0 and when any other node in a branch terminating in a leaf contributes
0. We prove the bound in this case using Theorem 4.1 on a path and the induction
hypothesis on a smaller graph. In the last two cases, we consider the case when the
neighbour of a central node in a branch terminating in another center contributes 0 and
when any other node in a branch terminating in another center contributes 0. The proof
in this case involves the use of induction hypothesis on the two smaller trees formed by
restricting the graph to all nodes except the one contributing 0.
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First, for the base case, consider a star network with 3 peripheral nodes (m1 = 3),
i.e. CT = c1, BT = {{1}, {2}, {3}}. Using Theorem 4.3, its aggregate play ≤ 3 =
4+3−1
2
.
Hence, our bound holds for the base case.
Let G be a tree (T ) with CT = {c1, c2, . . . , ct} as the set of centers (CT 6= ∅). Let Pij
denote the branch connecting ci and cj . Let the degree of center ci be denoted by di.
Let center ci have branches S
i
1, S
i
2, . . . , S
i
mi
of length ni1, n
i
2, . . . , n
i
mi
connected to it which
terminate at leaves.
Induction Hypothesis: For all trees T ′ with centers CT ′ = {c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
t′}(CT 6= ∅), BT ′ as
the set of branches (|BT ′| = m) and for δ ≥
1
2
with |V (G′)| < |V (G)|, the aggregate play
of a Nash equilibrium is at most |V (T
′)|+m−|CT |
2
.
Case 1: σ(x) = V.
Let xcj denote the action of centre cj and x
j
i,l is the action of the leaf of path S
j
i . If an
equilibrium has full support the discounted sum of plays of the closed neighbourhood of
each node is one, i.e. (Ci(x)) = 1. Then,
∑
i∈V
Ci(x) =
∑
i∈V
xi + 2δ(
∑
i∈V
xi) + δ(
∑
cj∈CT
(dj − 2)xcj)− δ(
∑
cj∈CT
mj∑
i=1
xji,l)
|V (T )|+ δ(
∑
cj∈CT
mj∑
i=1
xjl,i) = (2δ + 1)
∑
i∈V
xi + δ(
∑
cj∈CT
(dj − 2)xcj)
|V (T )|+ δ(
∑
cj∈CT mj)
(2δ + 1)
≥
∑
i∈V
xi (putting worst case values of xcj and x
j
l,i)
|V (T )|+
∑
cj∈CT
mj
2
2
≥
∑
i∈V
xi (since the LHS above is maximized at δ = 0.5)
|V (T )|+
∑
cj∈CT mj − 1
2
≥
∑
i∈V
xi,
since
∑
cj∈CT
mj
2
≤
∑
cj∈CT mj − 1. Now, there are |CT | − 1 branches which have both end-
points as centers and m = |BT | =
∑
cj∈CT mj + |CT | − 1. Thus, the aggregate play of an
equilibrium with full support is at most |V (G)|+m−|CT |
2
.
Case 2: σ(x) ⊂ V , a proper subset
We divide this case into five separate cases. In each case, the on restricting the network
to all nodes except one, which contributes to 0, we get a few smaller disconnected sub-
networks of the original network. Using Lemma 2.1, x restricted to these networks is an
equilibrium of the game on these networks. Thus, finding upper bounds on the aggregate
effort of equilibria on these networks and adding them up gives an upper bound on the
aggregate effort of the original network.
Case 2a: xcj = 0 for some cj ∈ CT .
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get mj line networks of lengths
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ci
cj
. . . b1 . . . b2
Figure 10: cj is the node with xcj = 0. On restricting T to V (T )\{cj}, edge ci, cj ceases
to exist and ci is no longer a center in the new disjoint tree. b1 and b2 denote the two
branches emanating from ci in T . But, in the new tree, the number of branches also
decreases by 1 since b1 and b2 now merge into a single branch including ci.
nj1, n
j
2, . . . , n
j
mj
and dj − mj = tj disjoint trees T
1, . . . , T tj with centers CT 1 , . . . , CT tj
such that
⋃tj
i=1 CT i ⊂ CT\cj and branches BT 1 , . . . ,BT tj . By the induction hypothesis,
Theorem 4.1 and adding all the bounds we get
∑
i∈V
xi ≤
tj∑
i=1
|V (T i)|+ |BT i| − |CT i|
2
+
∑mj
i=1 n
j
i +mj
2
.
Note that
∑tj
i=1 |V (T
i)| +
∑mj
i=1 n
j
i = |V (T )| − 1. Also, if |CT | =
∑tj
i=1 |CT i| + 1, no new
branches are added and we have |BT | =
∑tj
i=1 |BT i |+mj , giving
∑tj
i=1(|BT i|− |CT i |)−1+
mj = |BT |−|CT |. If |CT |−
∑tj
i=1 |CT i |−1 = k(> 0), then |BT |−
∑tj
i=1 |BT i |−mj = k. This is
because whenever a node ci ( 6= cj) which was a center in T but is not a center in Ti formed
by restricting T to vertex set V (T )\{cj}, the number of branches in Ti also decreases by
1. This is graphically shown in Figure 10. Thus, we have
∑tj
i=1(|BT i | − |CT i|)− 1+mj =
|BT | − |CT | giving ∑
i∈V
xi ≤
|V (T )|+m− |CT |
2
.
Case 2b: The (r + 1)th node from cj in path S
j
i contributes 0, where nmj − 1 ≥ r ≥ 1,
i.e. xji,r+1 = 0
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get a path of length nmj − 1 − r
and a tree T ′ with centers CT ′ = CT and |V (T ′)| = |V (T )| − (nmj − r) and the number
of branches remain the same. By the induction hypothesis and Theorem 4.1, we get∑
i∈V xi ≤
|V (T ′)|+m−|CT |
2
+
nmj−1−r+1
2
≤ |V (T )|+m−|CT |
2
.
Case 2c: The neighbour of a central node cj in S
j
i contributes 0, i.e. x
j
i,1 = 0.
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get a path of length nm1 − 1
and a tree T ′ with centers CT ′ = CT , |V (T ′)| = |V (T )| − (nmj ) and |BT ′ | = |BT | − 1.
By the induction hypothesis and Theorem 4.1, we get the upper bound as
∑
i∈V xi ≤
|V (T ′)|+|BT ′ |−|CT ′ |
2
+
nmj−1+1
2
= |V (G)|+|BT |−|CT |−1
2
< |V (G)|+|BT |−|CT |
2
.
Case 2d: The (r + 1)th node from cj in P
ij
join contributes 0, where |P
ij
join| − 3 > r ≥ 1.
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get two trees T i and T j with centers
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CT i , CT j satisfying CT i∪CT j = CT and branches BT i,BT j satisfying |BT i|+ |BT j | = |BT |+1.
Also, |V (T i)|+ |V (T j)| = |V (T )| − 1. By Induction Hypothesis, we get
∑
i∈V
xi ≤
|V (T i)|+ |BT i | − |CT i |
2
+
|V (T j)|+ |BT j | − |CT j |
2
=
|V (G)|+ |BT | − |CT |
2
.
Case 2e: The neighbouring node of cj in P
ij
join contributes 0.
On restricting the network to the rest of the nodes, we get two trees T i and T j with centers
CT i , CT j and branches BT i ,BT j respectively. Note that |V (T
i)| + |V (T j)| = |V (T )| − 1.
Now, there are two possible cases -
(i) CT i ∪ CT j = CT
In this case, |BT i + BT j | = |BT |. By Induction hypothesis, we get the upper bound as
∑
i∈V
xi ≤
|V (T i)|+ |BT i| − |CT i|
2
+
|V (T j)|+ |BT j | − |CT j |
2
<
|V (T )|+ |BT | − |CT |
2
.
(ii) CT i ∪ CT j = CT \cj
In this case, |BT i + BT j | = |BT | − 1. This is because, when cj is no longer a center on
removing a neighbouring node in Pij, it must have had exactly two other branches other
than Pij . Now, since Pij is not a branch in the new graph, the two other branches are
counted only as one along with the node cj in the branch. By Induction hypothesis, we
get the upper bound as
∑
i∈V
xi ≤
|V (T i)|+ |BT i | − |CT i |
2
+
|V (T j)|+ |BT j | − |CT j |
2
<
|V (T )|+ |BT | − |CT |
2
.
Hence, the aggregate play is at most |V (G)|+|BT |−|CT |
2
for all equilibria. 
A.8 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Let the aggregate play maximizing ICE be given by x∗.
(a) We maximize the RHS of (11) over x to get
W (x; δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσb
∑
i∈V
x∗i
≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe
∗
(
|V (G)|+m− |CT |
2
)
(20)
Since (20) holds for every x such that x
e∗
∈ SOLδ(G), we have
W ∗(δ, G) ≤ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + cdmaxδσbe∗
(
|V (G)|+m− |CT |
2
)
.
(b) Since (10) holds for all x, we consider this equation for x∗, i.e.
W ∗(δ, G) ≥W (x∗; δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((δ + 1)σb − 1)
∑
i∈V
x∗i
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For σb ≤
1
1+δ
, to minimize the lower bound, we need to consider the maximum value
of
∑
i∈V x
∗
i . Thus, we have for σb ≤
1
1+δ
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((δ + 1)σb − 1)e∗
(
|V (G)|+m− |CT |
2
)
.
(c) For σb ≥
1
1+δ
, to minimize the lower bound, we need to consider the minimum value
of
∑
i∈V x
∗
i . Thus, we have for σb ≥
1
1+δ
W ∗(δ, G) ≥ n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + c((δ + 1)σb − 1)e
∗
(
|V (G)|+ r − |CT |
2
)
,
where r is the number of branches which are of odd length.
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